Key Takeaways
- Many corporate networks still let an unknown device onto the internal VLAN simply by plugging into a wall port, with no network access control.
- The chain was: an open port, to LLMNR/NBT-NS poisoning, to captured credentials or NTLM relay, to lateral movement, to Domain Admin.
- LLMNR and NBT-NS are legacy name-resolution protocols that let an attacker on the LAN answer broadcast queries and capture authentication.
- NTLM relay works because SMB signing is not enforced. Enforcing signing and disabling LLMNR breaks the two most common internal links.
- This whole chain is detectable and preventable with controls that are free or built in: 802.1x, disabling LLMNR, SMB signing and LAPS.
A Wall Port and No Questions
Physical and internal engagements often begin in the most ordinary way. We were shown to a meeting room, and the network port under the table was live and placed us straight onto the corporate VLAN. There was no network access control: the switch did not care what device we were, whether it was managed, or who we were. A DHCP lease and we were a peer on the internal network.
That first link, no control over what connects, is the one that makes everything after it possible. On a properly segmented network with device authentication, an unknown laptop would have landed on a quarantine VLAN with no access to anything. Here, it landed in the middle of everything.
Link 1: Poisoning the Network's Bad Habits
Windows networks are chatty. When a machine cannot resolve a name through DNS, it falls back to broadcast protocols, LLMNR and NBT-NS, shouting "does anyone know where this server is?" to the whole local network. These protocols have no authentication, so any device on the LAN can answer, "yes, that is me".
We ran Responder, which does exactly that: it listens for these broadcast queries and answers them, telling the asking machines to authenticate to us. Mistyped share names, stale drive mappings and background service lookups all generate these queries constantly. Within minutes, Windows machines were sending us their users' authentication material, in the form of NetNTLMv2 hashes.
responder -I eth0listens for and poisons LLMNR, NBT-NS and MDNS requests on the local network.- Captured NetNTLMv2 hashes can be cracked offline with
hashcatif the password is weak, or relayed live if not. - The queries come from normal activity: a fat-fingered
\\fileserver, a disconnected mapped drive, a service looking for a host that no longer exists.
Want to Know Your Real Attack Chain?
Codesecure runs red team and internal penetration tests that start where a real attacker starts: an unauthenticated foothold, and chain the misconfigurations until something breaks. You get the full attack path, mapped to MITRE ATT&CK, with the exact fixes that break each link. ISO/IEC 27001:2022 certified delivery, named OSCP, CEH and CISSP consultants, across India, Singapore, UAE and Malaysia.
See Red Team and VAPT Services →Link 2: Relaying Trust With No SMB Signing
Some captured passwords were weak and cracked offline in minutes. But we did not even need that, because of the second default: SMB signing was not enforced. SMB signing is the control that makes a server verify who it is really talking to. Without it, we could take an authentication that a machine sent us and relay it, in real time, to a different machine, logging in as that user without ever knowing their password.
Using ntlmrelayx, we relayed captured authentication to other hosts on the network. Where the relayed user happened to be a local administrator on the target, we could dump that machine's local secrets and credentials. The combination of "any device can poison name resolution" and "servers do not verify who they talk to" is one of the most reliable footholds in all of internal penetration testing.
ntlmrelayx -tf targets.txt -smb2supportrelays poisoned authentication to hosts that do not enforce signing.- A successful relay to a host where the user is local admin yields the local SAM and cached credentials via
secretsdump. - Domain controllers enforce signing by default; member servers and workstations usually do not, which is where relay succeeds.
Link 3: Lateral Movement to Domain Admin
Now we had a local administrator's credentials and some domain user hashes. The endgame is the same as every internal chain: find where a privileged account has been used and steal its credentials. Using the harvested hashes, we sprayed access across the network (pass-the-hash with a tool like CrackMapExec), identifying machines where our stolen local-admin password was reused, a very common pattern when every workstation is built from the same image with the same local admin password.
Reused local-admin credentials gave us administrative access to a swathe of machines. On one of them, a Domain Admin had recently logged in, leaving credentials in memory. We dumped them, and that was the game: a Domain Admin account, obtained without a single exploit, from a port under a meeting-room table.
crackmapexec smbwith a captured hash sprays the network to find where credentials are reused, the classic local-admin-password-reuse problem.- Reused local admin passwords across machines mean one cracked or relayed credential unlocks many hosts.
- The final step is finding a privileged session to loot, which tiering and Credential Guard are designed to prevent.
The Whole Chain
Four links, none of them a vulnerability in the CVE sense, all of them defaults someone never changed:
- 1. No network access control put an unknown device on the corporate VLAN.
- 2. LLMNR/NBT-NS let us poison name resolution and capture authentication.
- 3. No SMB signing let us relay that authentication and harvest credentials.
- 4. Reused local-admin passwords and a Domain Admin session gave us the domain.
Not Sure Where Your Chain Starts?
Most compromises begin with something small: an anonymous share, a reused password, a writable script. On a free 30-minute call our lead will map the most likely first links in your environment and how we would test them.
Book a Free Scoping Call →Catching It on the Wire
An internal attacker running this chain is detectable. Responder poisoning produces anomalous name-resolution responses, and relay activity shows authentication arriving at hosts from unexpected sources. The lateral movement generates a burst of authentications as the attacker sprays credentials, and a Domain Admin logon on a workstation, followed by that machine authenticating widely, is a pattern a SIEM can catch.
A Wazuh-based SOC fed with Windows event logs can alert on password-spraying bursts, unusual privileged logons and lateral-movement patterns, and network monitoring can flag LLMNR anomalies. Detection assumes the port will sometimes be open and the protocols sometimes on; it catches the attacker walking the chain. As always, prevention and detection together are what close it.
Frequently Asked Questions
How can plugging into a network port lead to Domain Admin?
If the network has no access control, an unknown device lands directly on the corporate VLAN. From there an attacker can poison legacy name-resolution protocols (LLMNR and NBT-NS) with a tool like Responder to capture authentication, relay that authentication to hosts that do not enforce SMB signing, harvest reused local-admin credentials, move laterally, and eventually steal a Domain Admin's credentials from a machine where one logged in. Each step is a default that was never hardened, chained together.
What are LLMNR and NBT-NS and why disable them?
LLMNR and NBT-NS are legacy Windows protocols that resolve names by broadcasting a query to the local network when DNS fails. They have no authentication, so any device on the network can answer and say "that server is me", tricking machines into authenticating to an attacker. Because modern networks rely on DNS, these protocols are usually unnecessary, and disabling them via Group Policy removes a very common internal attack technique at no cost.
What is NTLM relay and how does SMB signing stop it?
NTLM relay is an attack where an attacker takes an authentication a machine sends and forwards it, in real time, to a different server, logging in as that user without knowing the password. It works when the target does not require SMB signing, which is the control that makes a server verify the integrity and origin of the connection. Enforcing SMB signing on all systems, not just domain controllers, causes relayed authentication to be rejected and breaks the attack.
How do we prevent internal network attack chains like this?
Layer the controls: enforce network access control (802.1x or NAC) so unknown devices cannot reach the corporate VLAN, disable LLMNR and NBT-NS, enforce SMB signing everywhere, use LAPS so local admin passwords are unique per machine, enforce administrative tiering so privileged accounts never log into workstations, enable Credential Guard, and monitor for poisoning, spraying and unusual privileged logons. Breaking any single link stops the chain.
Is this still a realistic attack in 2026?
Yes. Despite being well known, these defaults persist in a large share of corporate networks because disabling them requires deliberate hardening that is easy to defer. Open ports without NAC, LLMNR left on, and SMB signing unenforced remain among the most common and reliable findings on internal penetration tests, which is exactly why testing for them matters.
Can Codesecure run an internal network penetration test?
Yes. Codesecure runs internal network penetration tests and red team engagements that start from an unauthenticated position on your network and chain real misconfigurations, name-resolution poisoning, relay, lateral movement and Active Directory abuse, through to Domain Admin, mapped to MITRE ATT&CK. You get the attack path and the fix for each link. ISO/IEC 27001:2022 certified delivery with named OSCP, CEH and CISSP consultants across India, Singapore, UAE and Malaysia.
What Happens When Someone Plugs In?
Codesecure tests your internal network the way an attacker does, from an open port through name-resolution poisoning and relay to Domain Admin, then hands you the free or built-in fix at every link. Internal pentest and red team by named OSCP, CEH and CISSP consultants, ISO/IEC 27001:2022 certified, across India, Singapore, UAE and Malaysia.

